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COMMENT ON JOHN KAPLAN'S "ADMINISTERING
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT"
ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG*

Although he certainly would have made a valuable contribution to
these topics, Professor Kaplan decided not to concern himself with
the justice, the cost, or the deterrent effect of capital punishment.
Instead, he focuses on administering it, merely suggesting the bearing
administrative problems may have on justice and cost (not, however,
on deterrence). These self-imposed limitations, although well justified, diminish the relevance of Professor Kaplan's essay to the problem of capital punishment. By not letting his limitations limit my
comment I hope to increase its relevance.
There are two independent but compatible arguments for capital
punishment. The first, strongly felt, as most moral judgments are, is
that doing justice requires capital punishment as the only appropriate retribution for some crimes. Abolitionists, who do not accept this,
must believe that murderers always deserve, or have a right, to survive their victims, that no crime is horrible enough to deserve execution. I agree with the great majority of Americans: some crimes deserve no less.
The second argument is that the threat of capital punishment
may restrain some prospective murderers. There is no conclusive statistical proof for this; I doubt there ever can be. But experience and
common sense tell us that people fear nothing more than death. It
seems likely, therefore, that fear of death, or of the risk of death, will
deter more from crime, than fear of anything else, including imprisonment. And, as long as the execution of convicted murderers may
deter some prospective murderers and thus spare their victims, I believe capital punishment should be retained: the life of the innocents
who may be spared is valuable, whereas that of convicted murderers
is morally forfeited. I differ here from abolitionists such as Hugo Adams Bedau, Charles Black, Ramsey Clark, et al., who seem to value
the life of the convicted murderer more than that of any number of
innocent victims of future murderers: they have declared that they
would oppose capital punishment even if it were definitely shown to
deter a hundred murders per execution.
I do not know Professor Kaplan's views on these two arguments
for capital punishment. But if he rejects both, difficulties he found in
*John M. Olin Professor of Jurisprudence and Public Policy, Fordham University School
of Law, M.A., 1942, St. University of Iowa; Ph.D., 1952, New York University.
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the administration of capital punishment become irrelevant; for he
would reject capital punishment even if it could be administered in
the most perfect, fair and costless way, so as to eliminate all difficulties. On the other hand, if the difficulties Professor Kaplan describes
could be overcome, capital punishment would become acceptable
only if one accepts either, or both, of the retentionist views I have
sketched. I do. It is relevant therefore to my position, but not necessarily to Professor Kaplan's, to try to show that the administrative
difficulties that concern 'him can be overcome, or do not matter.
In an extended simile Professor Kaplan suggests that, although it
is desirable to reward the best teachers, it is administratively hard,
perhaps impossible, to identify them. Analogously, he believes that,
since not all murderers will be executed, it is desirable to execute the
worst; yet he shows, convincingly, that it is administratively impossible to identify the worst. He does not persuade me, however, that to
execute only, or even primarily, the worst murderers is a conditio
sine qua non of retaining capital punishment.
There are some weaknesses in Professor Kaplan's analogy, or at
least in his apparent conclusion. He points out that the Florida incentive plan for teachers cannot select the best: the qualifications
proposed (a master's degree, no more than eighteen absences over the
past two years, a certain score on a national teachers' examination)
certainly do not identify the best teachers. Yet, Florida does have an
interest in teachers acquiring advanced degrees (unless they are in
gassy subjects such as education), minimizing absences and passing
national teachers' examinations. Thus, the Florida plan is not useless,
even if it is only a step toward identification of better teachers. There
is no reason to give it up; even if the plan does not select the very
best teachers, it does not produce an altogether random or irrelevant
selection.
So with the death penalty. It is not really possible to select the
worst murderers for execution, unless murderers do us the favor of
committing only readily classifiable murders and a scale is invented
to measure and compare cruelties. Often we do not have, or are not
allowed to use, sufficient evidence against some of the worst murderers. They may escape punishment altogether, or have the charges
against them reduced, however terrible their actual crimes. Charges
may be reduced as well as to obtain testimony against accomplices.
And sometimes we do not catch murderers. Finally, they cannot all
be prosecuted and defended by the same lawyers before the same
jury and the same judge. Thus, judgments and punishments would
differ even if the murders were identical. Chances of executing all, or
only, the worst murderers are slim. Despite all this, the law can make
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it likely that mainly those convicted murderers who are regarded as
among the worst by local courts will be executed. This satisfies me. It
does not satisfy Professor Kaplan, who here comes perilously close, at
least by implication, to confusing a reasonable social desire to have
the worst murderers executed, with a right of the less than worst
murderers not to be executed. There is no such right.
Professor Kaplan next turns to miscarriages of justice, which may
cause innocent persons, or persons innocent of the crime of which
they are convicted, to suffer the death penalty. He quotes my view
that abolitionists ought not to care, since they anyway would not execute anyone, guilty or innocent, and calls it "too simplistic." It is. As
Professor Kaplan points out some abolitionists may think it is bad to
execute a guilty person, but worse to execute an innocent one; they
may be abolitionists because they feel that is is better not to execute
anyone than to run that risk. I was wrong.
Because justice is done by fallible humans, some miscarriages will
occur despite all efforts to minimize them. They will lead to the unintended execution of innocents who never consented to take the relevant risk. The driving of trucks by government employees will lead to
the unintended death of innocents, such as children playing on the
sidewalk, who did not consent to take the relevant risk. Yet, nobody
urges abolishing trucks, or preventing the government from using
them. Any human activity can lead to the death of innocents. We
nevertheless persist in our activities when we find them useful
enough to bear the harm they cause. Is justice less useful than truck
driving? I think justice is useful enough and morally desirable
enough to outweigh the moral and material harm done by its miscarriages. Even though Professor Kaplan is undoubtedly right in asserting that the death of an innocent by execution is more painful to him
and more harmful to the community than an accidental death, I believe that the moral and material need for justice outweighs this
painful harm.
Even for the guilty, I think, as Professor Kaplan does, that execution is much worse for the executed than dying from other causes but not for the reasons Professor Kaplan gives. My reasons are, in
brief: when one is to be executed he does not just die, he is forcibly
expelled from life. He is told that he is too depraved, unworthy of
living with other humans. Threatened by death, we normally receive
all the help and comfort society can give. But the convict is condemned to die. Society, far from helping him to survive, deliberately
shortens his life. The fear of the death penalty is fear of being put to
death deliberately, of being ignominiously separated, expelled from
among the living. This is the experience the convict is sentenced to.
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He is felt not to be entitled to a natural death but to deserve death
by execution.
Professor Kaplan too thinks that execution is worse for the executed than death otherwise caused. But his reasons appear flimsy to
me. The circumstances of execution, he believes, cause unjust excess
suffering, because the convict can anticipate his execution for some
time. Professor Kaplan quotes Albert Camus to suggest that "[t]here
could not be real justice" in the death penalty because the person to
be executed first is "reduced to a condition so helpless, so hopeless
and so powerless." He has been notified of his execution and prevented from resisting it, whereas his victim was not so notified and
may have had a chance to escape.
Consider two of the many things wrong with the picture Camus
draws, and which Professor Kaplan endorses. Camus believes, in Professor Kaplan's words, that "we will almost inevitably be doing something much worse to the murderer than the murderer did to his victim." How does Professor Kaplan know? How did he measure the
suffering of the victim and compare it to that of the murderer, to
decide that the murderer suffers more? Surely some victims suffered
little: they may have been dispatched unexpectedly and swiftly.
Others, however, were slowly tortured to death and their children
were tortured to death before their eyes. How does Professor Kaplan
know that they suffered less than their murderers suffer when waiting for execution?
Beyond his speculation about comparative suffering, resting on a
nonexisting measurement and questionable interpersonal comparison
of suffering, there is a logical misconception in the reasoning shared
by Camus and his admirer: "There could not be real justice" Camus
writes, as long as the suffering of the murderer exceeds that of the
victim. Suppose somebody had actually shown that it does. Why
would that not be "real justice"? Does "real justice" require that the
suffering of the criminal not exceed that of his victim? When we sentence a burglar to two years in prison, do we feel that he suffers not
more (or less) than his victim? Suppose his victim, a wealthy man,
did not suffer at all? Does the rapist sentenced to one year, or ten,
suffer more or less than his victim? I was under the impression that
justice only requires that punishments be deserved and that laws and
courts decide whether the punishment is appropriate to the gravity of
the crime, or perhaps to the need to deter from it, regardless of
whether the punishment causes more or less pain than suffered by
the victim of the crime punished. What justifies the demand for
equal suffering of murderer and victim? Professor Kaplan does not
tell. Were we to accept his idea, we might have to torture some mur-
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derers and, perhaps, to reward others. Or does Professor Kaplan suggest that it is "real justice" if the victim suffers more than the murderer, but not if the murderer suffers more than his victim?
Professor Kaplan goes on to compare execution to the painful
wait of a terminally ill patient, aware of the certainty and proximity
of his death and unable to elude it. I should think that the patient is
materially worse off, for physically he may suffer more. Morally the
murderer may feel worse, because he is aware that his death is deliberately inflicted by a court because of his crime. Nonetheless, Professor Kaplan alleges that the psycho-physical pain of execution, independent of its punitive character, exceeds that of dying otherwise
and is, somehow, too much. Too much as retribution? Too much for
deterrence? We are not told. The implied conclusion that capital
punishment is, by its nature, excessive, seems a non sequitur: pain is
not necessarily too much pain. Further, the pain Professor Kaplan is
concerned with does not exceed the pain suffered by innocent persons dying in a hospital, and may be less.
Professor Kaplan also worries about the murderer's relatives who
might suffer from losing him by execution and by being stigmatized.
He does not mention that they may primarily suffer from knowing
they they have a murderer in the family. At any rate, if the punishment is deserved, the fact that families may suffer does not make it
less so, although we may feel sorry for the disgrace and the suffering
the murderer brought upon them, just as we feel sorry for his victims
and their families.
At this point Professor Kaplan returns to miscarriages of justice,
now to stress that one who is executed although innocent, suffers
more than one who is executed and guilty. This seems true. The
Spenkelink case is discussed here. The defendant, Professor Kaplan
believes, was guilty not of murder, as the court decided, but of voluntary manslaughter. Not having studied the case firsthand I have no
wish to second guess either the court, or Professor Kaplan. At any
rate the execution of a totally innocent person is a terrible thing. But
that possibility, though certainly worse for the executed than accidental death, does not persuade me to favor the nonexecution of the

guilty.
Professor Kaplan notes, correctly in my view, that the chances
that only the worst murderers will be executed are slim. The opinion
of the jury, on whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating ones, can hardly be more than an opinion. Thus, among the
guilty, the death penalty may be somewhat arbitrarily distributed.
Similar cases may be decided differently and less cruel murderers
may receive harsher punishment, even death, than worse murderers.
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Professor Kaplan made this objection before, drawing an analogy
with the selection of teachers for rewards. Here, however, Professor
Kaplan uses what he calls arbitrariness in the distribution of the
death penalty among those convicted of murder as an argument for
abolishing it, though, to be sure, not a conclusive one. He adds, I
presume correctly, that in addition to randomness, there is also racial
discrimination in the distribution of the death penalty: murderers of
whites, whether themselves black or white, are four times more likely
to be sentenced to death than other murderers.
Randomness is undesirable. Ideally the worst murderers should
have priority. We are likely to execute only a very few of the all too
many murderers among us. That, indeed, makes selection of the very
worst for execution all the more desirable. But we both know, although Professor Kaplan does not stress it, that to demand exact priorities is to ask for impossible perfection. Where trials are held in
local courts, under rules differing state by state, there is no way of
legally identifying the worst murderers.
Professor Kaplan also writes:
[T]he execution of those who shouldn't be executed deprives
us of the ability to execute others we regard as more deserving
of the death penalty. Even if ardent partisans of capital punishment concede there are more candidates for the death penalty than space available, they no doubt wish to reserve that
space for those who have committed the most aggravated
killings.
Here, Professor Kaplan has been captured by his own captivating imagery. I hasten to set him free. There is no question of "space" for
executions; nor does one execution "deprive us of the ability to execute others." That would be true only if there were a ceiling, a fixed
number of permitted executions. There isn't. Professor Kaplan has
confused his own, correct, prediction that there will be rather few
executions, given the behavior of our courts, with a legal prescription
rationing executions so that, if we execute Smith, we cannot execute
Jones, who may be a worse murderer. There is no such rationing.
Still, randomness in distributing punishments is bad; racial discrimination in sentencing the guilty is worse and worst when execution is at stake. Do either random distribution, or discrimination, in
the distribution of the death penalty among the guilty, argue for its
abolition? We succeed in punishing as deserved only some of the
guilty. Is it an excuse in law, or morality, for the guilty who have
been sentenced, to point out that others have escaped their deserved
punishment, totally or in part? If we accepted such an excuse nobody
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ever could be punished.
Should better distribution of capital punishment turn out to be
impossible, neither random, nor discriminatory distribution among
the guilty argues for abolition of the death penalty. To think otherwise, as Professor Kaplan appears to do, is to confuse justice with
equality. Both are desirable. However, neither can replace the other.
If we have to choose I prefer justice: I would rather see some of the
guilty punished as deserved than none, some of the innocent spared
than none. Yet, equal injustice would demand that we "punish" all
the innocents if we "punish" any and that none of the guilty be punished as deserved if some are not.
The desire for equality has led some lawyers to allege that
sentences, especially of death, exceeding other sentences, are morally
or constitutionally defective. This argument must be rejected.
Sentences must be appropriate, i.e., felt to be proportioned to the
gravity of the crime. The fact that they exceed other sentences for
the same crime (or for what we think of as the same crime since each
crime is unique) is irrelevant. Guilt is personal. That someone else,
"equally" guilty, got away with murder, be it because of some random factor, or because of discrimination, intended or unintended,
does not make the murderer to be sentenced less guilty. Ideally no
one should get away with murder. We should do our best to prevent
it; but an imperfect system is better than none. As long as the defendant is guilty he should be sentenced accordingly, even if others, as
bad or worse, have not been convicted or sentenced as they should
have been.
Professor Kaplan laments, as I do, the many delays in executing
sentences of death. These delays make the sentences unnecessarily
cruel. Yet Professor Kaplan thinks the delays are indispensable for
the sake of justice. Surely sometimes this is true. But always? Does
he really think all our procedures and collateral appeals are necessary? I believe a great deal of streamlining could be done without
increasing the risk of injustice. I regret that in drawing attention to
the many difficulties in administering capital punishment Professor
Kaplan did not offer proposals for reducing them. Had he done so, he
would have enriched an already rich and suggestive essay.
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